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Abstract: This study aims to understand better research and innovation strategies for smart spe-
cialization (RIS3) and assess how they influence university-industry (U-I) collaboration empirically.
Primary data were collected from a focus group consisting of representatives of universities and
government entities from Portugal and Spain. Secondary European Union (EU) data on the applica-
tion of smart specialization measures and the innovation in these two countries were also included.
The results reveal difficulties in implementing RIS3, resulting in decreased investment in research
and innovation in all production sectors. Evidence also pointed to the negative impact of smart
specialization measures on U-I collaboration and, consequently, on the respective knowledge transfer.
Keywords: smart specialization strategy; RIS3; entrepreneurial discovery process; governance
1. Introduction
The global crisis that began in 2008 brought European Commission (EC) attention to
the situation in some of its member countries and exposed key problems and unsustainable
developments in many member states [1]. The sluggishness in productivity recovery and
the financial crisis have underlined that EE countries need a renewed emphasis on obstacles
to structural change and well-functioning innovation systems [2]. The effectiveness of re-
search systems plays an important role in economic growth and directly impacts all sectors
of current society. The level and efficient use of public research and development (R&D)
funding are decisive factors, along with the establishment, maintenance and development
of mechanisms to improve structural performance, conditions and processes [3]. Therefore,
as part of its cohesion policy, the EC devised the Smart Specialization Program to identify
strategic areas of intervention based on analysing the economic strengths and opportunities
in each region. This innovative approach aimed to boost growth and jobs in Europe and
enable each region to identify and develop its competitive advantages [4].
The academic concept of smart specialization was developed in the mid-late 2000s [5].
Afterward, the EC’s Knowledge for Growth Expert Group was chosen to develop this
idea and make it a reality [6,7]. Specialization in R&D and innovation is crucial, especially
for the less technologically developed countries [6]. According to the European Growth
Strategy, the EC aims for the European Union (EU) to “become a smart, sustainable and
inclusive economy” by 2020. These three mutually reinforcing priorities should help the
EU and member state employment, productivity and social cohesion [8]. To this end, five
targets have been set for 2020 (e.g., employment, innovation, education, social inclusion
and climate/energy), and each member state has adopted its national targets for each area.
Thus, national and regional authorities across Europe have devised smart specialization
strategies so that the European structural and investment funds can be used more efficiently
and synergies between different EU, national and regional policies might be increased in
conjunction with the levels of public and private investment [8].
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Thus, more than 120 smart specialization strategies have been developed by mem-
ber states and their regions through partnerships, multilevel governance and bottom-up
approaches, setting priorities for research and innovation investments for the 2014–2020
period. That is, public funds to support research, innovation and development will be
applied to the best projects that are strategically aligned with the priorities set in each
country and/or region [9].
The detailed analysis of each region, its innovation index, and its priority invest-
ment objectives has brought about a better and more thorough understanding of the
regional economies. This, in turn, led to the design of support policies tailored to each
region. However, the effect of these smart specialization regional development policies
and the Entrepreneurial Discovery Process (EDP) need to be assessed [10,11]. Moreover,
understanding the impact of these measures on the relationship between universities and
industry is also essential. Given this gap in the literature, this study aims to elucidate the
smart specialization strategy and empirically evaluate these measures’ influence on U-I
collaboration. Thus, this research is based on the following research questions:
• What is the impact of RIS3 on the U-I relationship?
• How has RIS3 influenced U-I knowledge transfer?
The article is structured as follows. The next section presents the literature review,
and the third one describes the methodology. The main results appear in the fourth part. A
discussion of the results follows before the last section presents the conclusions and policy
implications and suggests future research lines.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Regional Innovation Systems
One of today’s greatest challenges is generating, applying and disseminating scientific
knowledge and transforming it into technological innovation. The growth of countries
such as the United States, Germany and Japan demonstrates how a favourable national
environment can influence stimulating innovation. When the US and European economies
were losing out to Japan, the latter became a major world leader [12]. Freeman [13] and
Lundvall and Andersen [14] have highlighted the differences in the rate at which countries
exploit the possibilities offered by technological gaps, especially in those periods when
major changes occur in technical-economic paradigms or technological trajectories. These
differences are believed to depend on each country’s ability to mobilize political and
financial resources to transform the technological, institutional, and economic structures
that comprise the national innovation system [15]. The debate on industrial policies in the
US and Europe in the 1980s led to the concept of the National Innovation System [16] that
has since been widely studied and defended by [17–19].
The economic crisis of 2008 led to the creation of the EU smart regional specializa-
tion strategy (RIS3) that has aimed to make European regions internationally competi-
tive [20,21]. Given each member state’s specificity and heterogeneity, smart specialization
seeks to bridge the gap between less innovative regions and technology centres by iden-
tifying each region’s unique innovation resources. Each has had to carefully analyse its
strengths and weaknesses and determine the areas to invest in becoming innovative and
competitive [22]. This allows the regions to include those sectoral projects with the greatest
promise to promote regional development and continuously seek out new and innovative
activities [23–25]. This context led us to the first proposition (P1) of this study:
P1: Smart specialization encourages innovation in countries considered less innovative.
The smart specialization strategy’s main purpose is to modernize traditional segments,
being progressive by definition [22,23,26,27]. Thus, the second research proposition (P2)
was formulated:
P2: Choosing priority investment areas for innovation facilitates the transfer of technology and
knowledge through funded projects.
J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2021, 7, 82 3 of 18
However, smart specialization measures require high governance capacity levels,
especially in regions with limited institutional resources, such as economically weaker
regions. Existing studies show the need for an explicit and structured process of analysis,
reflection, and prioritization within the chosen domains and areas [28], in addition to
the monitoring and evaluation of activities, which must be adapted to each regional
context [24,29]. Thus, the third proposition (P3) was:
P3: The governance models process is successfully implemented, facilitating the necessary changes
to RIS3.
With the present community framework in its final stages, it is necessary to study and
clarify the measures adopted to be reviewed within the next investment cycle. Several
studies point to the need to review the priorities and themes chosen [29,30]. Taken together,
the socio-economic analyses of the European regions studied herein may help to clarify
whether priority changes for each regional and national smart specialization strategy
are indicated.
2.2. Entrepreneurial Discovery Process
Dominique Foray states that RIS3 is “largely about the policy process for selecting
and prioritizing fields or areas if a cluster of activities is to be developed and allowing
entrepreneurs to discover the right domain of future specialization” [31]. To identify the
areas to receive potentially transformative investments, the RIS3 concept suggests that
an entrepreneur-driven, self-discovery process will be implemented better to understand
regional opportunities [32,33].
The smart specialization approach refers to how competitive advantage can be uncov-
ered using EDP. However, RIS3 does not refer to entrepreneurship as commonly described,
rather creating a company as an individual entrepreneurial project [34,35]. Instead, in
this context, entrepreneurship should be more broadly understood to encompass all stake-
holders supporting entrepreneurship, whether they be entrepreneurs, other companies,
universities or other higher education institutions, as well as government entities and
society in general [36]. These actors can discover innovative domains to guarantee existing
and future competitiveness and entrepreneurial discovery [37]. The role of different stake-
holders varies in terms of involvement and impact on said discovery. Therefore, the process
needs to be business-oriented [38]. From this arose the fourth research proposition (P4):
P4: The EDP uncovers new opportunity domains.
Entrepreneurial discovery serves as the main information source for exploring new
opportunities and the transformational activities that must be prioritized. The private
sector should be managed with the support of research and innovation institutions, while
governments will ensure successful implementation and enhance actor coordination [23,39].
Thus, regional policymakers aim to foster a region-based EDP that might generate
intensive, customer-centred discovery. This direct addition of end-users to the innova-
tion process is a necessary organizational counterpart to an open innovation policy in
that it accords greater attention to consumers’ underlying needs. This quadruple helix
approach allows for a wider range of innovation, in addition to that based on technology
or science [1,40].
Therefore, smart specialization rejects the “pick winners” culture, favouring a radically
new process of financial support for innovation. The new strategy requires public-private
partnership in entrepreneurial discovery, and it is, thus, implemented as a bottom-up pro-
cess of the self-discovery of entrepreneurial capacity [41]. Recent studies have recognized
that the process must incorporate both ascending and descending processes [42,43], thereby
establishing broader and regionally more favourable research priorities [44].
Figure 1 illustrates the concepts discussed and this study’s research propositions.
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3. Methodology
Since the objective is to identify the critical perception of how RIS3 influences U-I
collaboration, its benefits, and any impediments, a qualitative study using interviews and
focus groups was the most appropriate research method.
Focus groups, originating from sociology [45] and initially used in marketing re-
search [46], have gained currency in social science research. This methodology can be
used to elucidate a spectrum of perceptions and attitudes about a fact, practice, product,
or service. It is similar to a group interview, without formalizing questions and answers
between researchers and interviewees [47,48]. Some researchers argue that focus groups’
interpersonal and interactive nature collects information that might not be obtained from
a single interviewee, thus generating a wider range of insights a d ideas [49–52]. This
focus group comprised eleven representatives, five univer ities (three Portuguese and two
Spanish) and six egional gove ning bodies (four Portugue e and two Spanish).
Inform tion was c llected f om each region’s RIS3 documents, statistic from the
Regional Innovation Scor board, PORDATA, EC reports and information available on
fficial pages to triangulate the data.
This data i cluded R&D expenditure in the public and business sectors, Non-R&D inno-
vation expenditures [53–56], as w ll as Expe diture in R&D and researchers involved in R&D
activi es (https://www.pordata.pt/en/DB/Euro /Search+Environment/Chart; https://
www.pordata.pt/en/DB/Europe/Search+Envir nment/Chart, accessed on 10 Feburay 2021).
The data (documents, interviews, a d focus group) was subjected to content analysis.
By organizing sources and coding data with NVIVO 11.0 software, it was possible to extract
useful and segment d information and create a tree map that lab lled and branched the
data. When the informati n was too varied in content or lacked sufficient instances to
capture patterns, thereby leading to coding difficulties, word cloud analysis was used. This
paper critically analysed the RIS3 implementation and how said measures might have
influenced U-I collaboration. The focus group opinions ere transcribed to facilitate their
reproduction and analysis.
4. Results
The focus data was sorted and categorized using various codes and categories. These
codes can either be either loose or grouped (into categories). Similar codes grouped related
data, and novel information prompted new categories. The most commonly discussed
topics were the RIS3 implementation itself, governance models and the EDP. Figure 2
shows participant opinions about influences on the RIS3 process.
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Figure 2. NVivo Node Map and Relationship.
RIS3 is shown to be associated with its implementation process and, therefore, with
the entrepreneurial discovery and governance processes. Participants recognized that these
factors might put the smart regional specialization process at risk in Portugal and Spain.
In addition, the RIS3 implementation was shown to be closely associated with the choices
of priorities, feeble stakeholder intervention, prioritization of innovation and insufficient
entrepreneurial culture in the region. Weak stakeholder participation in the governance
process was also seen as an obstacle. Other influences included changes regarding priority
areas and results monitoring. EDP, in turn, was influenced by a redefinition of strategic
areas, RIS3′s overly-technological approach, weak regional critical density, as well as
insufficient societal representation and the need for greater business support.
The following section compares Portuguese and Spanish innovation and uses respon-
dent quotes to illustrate the three main nodes of Figure 2.
4.1. P1: Smart Specialization Has Spurred Innovation in Countries Considered Less Innovative
Portugal and Spain were, until 2019, very similar in terms of innovation, both being
“moderate innovators”, with innovation performance decreasing between 2010 and 2016
compared to the EU average [53]. These data reflect that these countries’ entrepreneurial
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fabric consisted mainly of micro and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), with low
absorption and innovation capacity. The percentage of highly innovative companies is
extremely low. For example, Portuguese levels of innovative, intramural SMEs decreased
in 2016 to 79% of the EU average [54]. The R&D/GDP business expenditure ratio has also
declined recently, reaching a low of 1.27% in 2016, after a previous historical low of 1.58%
in 2009. This reveals a lack of concern with R&D investment in the business sector and all
execution sectors.
In 2020, Portugal became, a “strong innovator” [57]. The strong increase registered in
2018 is explained by the exceptional performance obtained in indicators such as “Innova-
tors”, “Innovation-friendly environment,” and “Attractive research systems”. According
to the European Innovation Scoreboard 2020, “Portugal scores particularly well on SMEs
innovating in-house, Broadband penetration, SMEs with product or process innovations,
and Foreign doctorate students. Sales impacts, Linkages, and Intellectual assets are the
weakest innovation dimensions. Portugal’s lowest indicator scores comprise Exports of
knowledge-intensive services, R&D expenditures in the business sector, Private co-funding
of public R&D expenditures, and Public-private co-publications” [57].
In Spain, lower relative spending on business research and development (€ 7 million
versus an average of € 29.9 per 10 million inhabitants over the period 2011–2015) is an
obstacle inhibiting innovation. Over the last two years, the rising Spanish GDP growth rate
(3.4% in 2015, 3.3% in 2016) has not translated into greater innovation. R&D intensity has
continued to decline since 2010 [55], suggesting an unwillingness to invest in R&D across
all sectors.
As regards Spain, the European Innovation Scoreboard 2020 strongest innovation
dimensions are “Human resources”, “Innovation-friendly environment” and “Employment
impacts”. “Spain scores high on New doctorate graduates, Sales of new-to-market and
new-to-firm product innovations, Broadband penetration, and Population with tertiary
education. Innovators, Firm investments, and Linkages are the weakest innovation di-
mensions. Low-scoring indicators include Exports of knowledge-intensive services, SMEs
innovating in-house, SMEs with product or process innovations, and R&D expenditures in
the business sector.” [57]
When looking at the percentage of jobs in knowledge-intensive service sectors, Portu-
gal’s gap relative to that of the EU is even greater (29.6% versus the 2016 EU average 37.2%),
while the high and/or medium production sectors and high technology also lagged behind
(2.33% and 4.63% in 2015). Spain, as well, has fewer jobs in knowledge-intensive services
(51.2% in Spain versus 58% in the EU from 2011 to 2015) and in high and/or medium
technology production (31% of employment) than the European average [56].
These figures reflect changes in both financing patterns and R&D performance,
notably RIS3.
There is little Portuguese data available about RIS3 implementation. However, all
regions have published their priorities and appear to be well prepared to fully implement
the process, while major limitations remain regarding levels of entrepreneurial discovery
implementation [56].
All 17 Spanish regions adapted their research and innovation to smart specialization
(RIS3) in 2017, many of which identifying similar priorities. However, intergovernmental
coordination is less than ideal, resulting in a lack of optimal synergy between national and
regional policies [58]. In Spain, as in Portugal, many entrepreneurial discovery implemen-
tation issues remain [55].
4.2. P2: Choosing Priority Investment Areas for Innovation Has Facilitated the Technology and
Knowledge Transfer through Funded Projects
In 2010, partly because of the devastating economic crisis in Europe, the continent
faced and continued to face major economic challenges that require an ambitious 21st
century economic policy. The EU 2020 strategy was to foster a social market economy,
intended to address structural weaknesses by making progress towards three mutually
reinforcing objectives: (i) smart growth, based on knowledge and innovation; (ii) sustain-
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able growth, promoting a more resource-efficient, greener, and more competitive economy;
and, (iii) inclusive growth, enhancing a high employment economy, while also providing
economic, social and territorial cohesion [59]. Thus, each country and region has identified
priority areas for applying community funds, considering their economic and technological
environment and identifying their competitive advantages. However, contrary to EC
guidelines, the choices were not standardized, as respondents pointed out.
[In Portugal, some regions have narrowed down their priorities to such an extent that
important projects are excluded. These are great value projects, some even disruptive, but
funded they have not been funded due to a lack of a certain wording. For the most part, in
Spain, most of the priority areas are too transversal, and they permit almost anything. No
serious, coherent and critical investigation has taken place into the regions. Again, this is
a European problem, not just limited to Portugal or Spain.] (Portuguese government
participant, PG).
[There are regions, in Spain and Portugal, with too many domains. I don’t understand
how projects with so many domains can be funded. And many of them are transversal.
There is no intelligent specialization in the true sense if we look closely, neither specializa-
tion nor intelligent. Look carefully at smart specialization strategies in Spain or Portugal.
There are similar domains in all of them. In fact, smart domains were not chosen where
the regions had proven critical capacity. Areas were chosen, period. This is the problem of
the least innovative, least innovation-critical countries, with a business fabric composed
mostly of micro and SMEs.] (Spanish government representative, SG).
Capello and Kroll pointed out as early as 2016 the lack of regional and/or national
interest, low innovation capacity, and general policies for RIS3 implementation across many
European regions [41]. The methods for determining and implementing priorities were
called attention to by the focus group:
[Little progress has been made in the granular process of choices. The EU made the
choices, and the countries or regions accepted them, and it is, therefore, easier to say that
they were made by someone other than us. We looked macroscopically at the areas of
regional interest. This leads to projects being funded only because they fall under RIS3,
leaving important areas outside] (PG).
One of the difficulties underlying the smart innovation specialization process was the
way the stakeholders were heard. Indeed, any innovation system needs different actors par-
ticipating in a complex network of relationships and dependencies, and innovation policy
must appropriately address this complexity. All players in the innovation system should
be heard. However, due to the urgency of combating an ongoing economic crisis, European
smart specialization policies were implemented in a hurry, if not totally “recklessly” [60].
All participants were not appropriately consulted. By way of example:
[Some European regions already had innovation policies similar to smart specialization, so
it was nothing new. In these regions, the RIS3 works like a well-oiled machine. For others,
measures have become mandatory, giving rise to problems. In the latter, stakeholder
involvement was, and still is, almost non-existent. In Portugal, for example, universities
played a very weak role, just listening and accepting the proposals by regional leaders.
The few choices made were the easiest. Little input was sought out from academics.
The same was true of businesspeople. There was no articulation between universities
and companies. Policymakers did the work and the same has taken place in many other
European regions] (PG).
These ex ante problems have led to several smart specialization implementation
challenges. Lesser-developed countries and/or regions often lack the formal institutions to
support these new measures and face serious problems in implementing them [28].
[RIS3 should have been a continuous learning process. But much remains to be done
Smart specialization cannot be a mere prioritization process. Innovation cannot be blindly
prioritized. There are a number of extremely innovative projects that are not funded
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solely because RIS3 does not cover the areas where they are located. There are innovative
products that will probably never reach the market because companies have neither the
financial capacity nor the knowledge to carry them forward] (Portuguese university
representative, PU).
[How to guarantee the mechanisms of choice? RIS3 should allow regions to choose which
projects they consider fundamental for their development, but we now know that they are
chosen because they meet the conditions of admissibility of RIS3 and merit rather than
the strategic dimension that was intended. Moreover, for that to occur, we would need
deep technical work] (Spanish university representative, SU).
Indeed, to take advantage of future EU opportunities, three types of strategic skills
are needed: the ability to identify local forces align political actions, and create critical
mass; and the regions’ capacity to develop a vision and implement the smart innovation
strategy [61].
4.3. P3: Process Governance Models Are Properly Implemented, Facilitating Necessary Changes
to RIS3
RIS3 requires a combination of integrated policies beyond R&D and that require
broader “transformation policies” at different levels. Therefore, governance models are
needed to ensure a coherent policy mix to support smart specialization strategy (S3) prior-
ities. However, efficient communication is often lacking between national governments.
This implies that, instead of being a purpose-driven construction, existing policy combina-
tions are often the unintended product of an accumulation of instruments over time and
across policy domains and levels [8].
The RIS3 process should be interactive and region oriented. While the precise orga-
nizational mix depends on the regional context, all partners must be fully involved in
developing, implementing and monitoring smart specialization strategies [59,62].
[In addition to ex ante problems such as those mentioned above, the implementation
of RIS3 also faces difficulties in governance models. Respondents complained about
an almost total absence of such models, despite being mandatory. In the words of
one participant, “In most regions, and in most cases, the involvement of all partners,
institutions and actors is extremely limited. Here governance models begin to fail”] (SU).
Another participant mentioned,
[We can’t mobilize partners for innovation, discovery, and problem-sharing meetings
when these people think we’re stealing time, because they don’t understand what they’ll
get when they go there. This has to be demystified. Stakeholders have to understand what
their role is in this smart specialization process. It has to be dynamic. What was a wild
card when originally choosing areas may no longer be so? Seven years have gone by, and
innovation does not appreciate such long periods] (PG).
[Unlike my Portuguese colleague, I think that we can mobilize the actors, the stakeholders,
whoever they are, if the meetings, the focus groups, the workshops are thematic, if concrete
issues are discussed, concrete problems, not RIS3 or its themes as a whole] (SG).
Awareness of strategy policy is, therefore, an essential tool for smart specialization
governance. However, in practice, the link between policy instruments and priority setting
is not explicit in most regions and countries [61]. To this end, benchmarks and criteria
for success and failure are needed. Policymaking should be flexible enough to discon-
tinue or reallocate public resources when assessments show that the goals are not being
met [10,24,29,59,63].
The absence of true governance models has, thus, brought about several obstacles to
implementing smart specialization. One Portuguese university representative expressed
the opinion, “As there is no governance model, there were Portugal adjustments at either
the regional or national RIS3. There was no adjustment of the strategies, which have
remained in the drawer.” A Portuguese government official, meanwhile, said,
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[Governance models are not implemented because, in RIS3, what matters is that fund-
ing is allocated according to the rules imposed. Only when Brussels enforces it that
governance models will appear and will be accorded their due importance, when the
Community Board is about to finish and if they have to present accounts to play on the
Community Framework 21–27] (PG).
Additional governance challenges or the absences of RIS3 governance mechanisms,
such as creating two-way communication channels include a shortage of qualified staff in
agencies and ministries. The latter is especially marked in the lesser developed and more
remote regions, especially when facing constraints on public finances and public sector
employment [24].
This was one of the issues raised by the focus group that partly justifies the absence of
governance models, in the words of a Spanish government representative, [“The problems
with a lack of governance or monitoring models have to do with the public sector capacity limitations,
and the paucity of financial resources, personnel and qualified personnel for the process.”]
Governance models need to be monitored to assess whether measures are being imple-
mented at the regional level. Various support tools are available. This is critical, especially
regarding the adoption of composite indicators during the weighing and aggregation
phases [30,64]. In the words of one participant,
[There are no governance models because there is no real monitoring of results, no
monitoring of indicators of realization, timing, allocated funds, even less in terms of real
economic benefits for the region, or innovative market results. What is the economic
result for the company? The EU appeals to the value of money, but the regions lack
effective indicators of said value. What is the return on funds allocated? Moreover, this
problem is not new; it is perpetual] (PG).
A Spanish government participant stated, [“We have several RIS3 instruments for moni-
toring and governance. What is lacking is their implementation. So, we are very late, not only in
Spain or Portugal, but throughout Europe” (SU.)].
Smart specialization strategies can, however, clash with other regional innovation
policy objectives, undermining EDP [41,65]. Therefore, regional governance systems need
structural change support strategies that focus funding on measures capable of yielding
the greatest return on economic and social development [66]. A Spanish university repre-
sentative stated that the lack of effective and efficient governance models may undermine
the RIS3 process, [“The designed model (RIS3) is interesting. However, governance models must
have room to intervene and function. We have to find room for entrepreneurial discovery. This is
not possible without a good governance model.”]
4.4. P4: New Opportunity Domains
Knowledge spillovers are undoubtedly one of the essential elements of intelligent
specialization theory [27]. Thus, RIS3 is the regional economic structure that encourages
investments in R&D and innovation, and that should enable it to generate scientific,
technological and economic expertise, thereby increasing competitiveness, productivity,
and, ultimately, economic growth [67].
The smart specialization approach requires a so-called “entrepreneurial selection” of
market opportunities that minimizes failures and avoids policy errors. In practice, this
means promoting entrepreneurship in general. While successful companies constitute the
new country and/or region specialization (self-discovery), the policy framework goal is to
develop a flexible strategy that focuses on measurable intermediate objectives, identifying
constraints and market failures, and ensuring feedback on learning processes [61]. What
distinguishes smart specialization from traditional industrial and innovation policies is
undoubtedly the EDP. However, in respondents’ view, the process has been delayed and is
almost non-existent in many regions.
[The entrepreneurial discovery process is slow, as might be expected. It started with a
very technological approach. There have been various criticisms of this approach, and
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Europe has already become aware of this problem, and now it is saying that the process
should not be so technological. And that’s why entrepreneurial discovery is still far from
what it should be and from what was set out in the EC’s guidelines] (PG).
[There is no entrepreneurial discovery in the true sense that RIS3 wants it to exist.
Incidentally, it does not exist at all. Choices were made in areas considered strategic, and
companies are now intended to innovate in these areas, in so-called golden niches] (PU).
Indeed, the main obstacles to knowledge-based growth in lesser industrialized or
developed regions include a dearth of highly skilled human capital, the lack of developed
entrepreneurial culture, and low absorptive capacity levels [68]. The limited sustained
fit between the fourfold propeller of innovation stakeholders is also an issue, particu-
larly between industry and academics [1]. Most SMEs, particularly in less developed
regions, are microenterprises with few resources to devote to research and innovation and
highly dependent on their regional innovation ecosystem. RIS3 aims to engage SMEs in
this ecosystem, increasing their innovation potential, providing better access to financial
resources and human capital [69].
[There are several restrictions on science. Most companies in the lesser developed regions,
whether Spanish, Portuguese, or any other European country, are microenterprises, or
SMEs, which lack the critical mass needed to succeed internationally. They cannot
innovate on their own. Here, universities and policymakers have failed. Companies need
support to find the difference, the “entrepreneurial breakthrough”. They cannot do it
alone, however much they hope or try to] (SG).
[I think that, in most of the regions, there are some misconceptions. What is the EDP
about? The same name is used for processes that must be very distinct. When we have
meetings around the themes chosen at RIS3, we may call them entrepreneurial discovery,
but they are not effective. The entrepreneurial breakthrough should sit the quadruple
helix players at the same table in search of new projects, starting from innovations of
interest to a particular cluster or company] (PG).
While smart specialization implies a growing focus on economically promising sectors,
the formulation and implementation of RIS3, centred on the effective EDP, may require
the identification and subsequent exploration of the potential for significant change. A
shift to more competitive and specialized production may require regional stakeholders to
look for radical products or process developments or even both [29]. This is an interactive
process in which all stakeholders come together for a more innovative, economically more
developed region [32,70].
However, some respondents believe that universities should lead the EDP by promot-
ing the reformulation of existing priority domains as centres of knowledge and innovation.
[Most regions lack the critical density to meet challenges. Here, universities can and
should play a key role. As centres of knowledge, science, and innovation, they must move
out of their comfort zone and look for market challenges. This is even more complex in
regions where there are no challenges. Most higher education institutions should not be
sitting and waiting for the next era, waiting to see their role in that new period. They
should already be involved in the smart strategy readjustment intervention process] (PG).
Many policymakers find it difficult to move from prioritization to policy instrument
development and the corresponding budgets. In most cases, prioritization is disconnected
from the budgetary process [71]. This is one of the obstacles to the EDP, and, as such, of the
entire smart specialization strategy [37].
5. Discussion: RIS3 and Open Innovation
5.1. Discussion: RIS3, and University-Industry Collaboration
Since 2014, access to European structural and investment funds for innovation has
been determined by the priority areas chosen by each of the regions according to intelligent
specialization. With regional RIS3, local actors’ influence in policy formulation directs
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the approach [72,73]. This can make it difficult to implement and govern these measures,
particularly in the lesser developed or less innovative regions [24,30].
Results show that Spain’s innovation rate has not changed, contradicting proposition
1 (intelligent specialization stimulated innovation in countries considered less innovative).
Portugal, in turn, has gone from moderate innovator to strong innovator. In this case, the
proposition has been validated.
As the community framework has almost reached an end, and after applying European
standards for implementing a smart specialization for innovation, Portugal and Spain’s
results are not positive. If we look at the results of the Regional Innovation ScoreBoard
2020 in terms of innovative products and processes, although some regions in Spain have
shown an increase in this indicator, the majority have obtained worse or similar results to
2017 [74]. The non-validation of proposition 1 seems to be in line with the results obtained
by the European Commission and the Spanish Government regarding the evaluation of
the implementation of RIS3 in this country. According to [75] there have been several
constraints to implementing smart specialization policies in Spain.
Some of these ex-ante constraints include:
- The overlap between the closure of the 2007–2013 period and the first years of the
2014–2020 period has led to a delay in implementing the Operational Programmes
for this period and, therefore in the start-up of RIS3. Likewise, there was insufficient
capacity to budget for actions from two different periods in many regions, and credits
from 2014 and 2015 have been used to close the previous 2007–2013 period.
- The delay in implementing the 2014–2020 period due to the delay in the European
publication. In addition, until well into 2015, a large number of delegated acts that
impacted the development of the operational programs continued to be produced; for
its part, the national regulations were also delayed, and the eligibility order was not
published until 2016, and there was also a delay in the approval of the funds and the
adoption of the operational programs.
- The increasing complexity in the management and justification of ERDF funds in this
period. This difficulty has created, among other things, the designation of Intermediate
Bodies, the difficulties encountered by beneficiaries when implementing actions, the
lack of definition or changes in eligibility criteria, etc.
- The participatory governance for elaborating the RIS3 has led to the proposal of new
instruments and actions in line with the new thematic areas and objectives pursued.
However, implementing these new instruments is limited by the existing regulatory
framework, the administrative procedure, and the existing inertia in the current
systems.
- The slowness in the administrative processing of procedures.
Regarding the constraints felt during the RIS3 implementation, the evaluations reports
point to:
- The RIS3 exercises in Spain showed a slipshod prioritization, i.e., many specialized
areas than each regional economic structure can justify.
- Although entrepreneurial discovery is at the heart of some strategies (they have
been included as part of participatory governance processes) the actual (or at least
operational) integration is not clear.
- In general, policy instruments and measures still lack specific (and tailored) ap-
proaches to meet the specific needs of sectors and innovation. sector-specific and
innovation-specific needs: they are horizontal and rather traditional concerning past
periods.
- Even though evaluation design and monitoring efforts have increased considerably, it
is unclear how complexity (and even general measures) can contribute to better policy
setting over the whole implementation period.
- RIS3 definition exercises have probably led to very formal documents, and risked
preventing the objectives proposed being met (due to lack of resources, capacities,
expectations, etc.).
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As regards Portugal, the number of innovative products and processes has been
increasing since 2017 [74], a period in which the results of the implementation of RIS3
measures have been felt concerning the Community funds allocated at the start of the
European Community Framework (Horizon 2020).
The RIO Country Report 2017 pointed out that Portugal, in particular, had one of
the lowest investment rates in the EU. Increased funding for R&D remained insufficient
to update the national research and innovation system. Low-worker qualification level
hinders investment and productivity growth. Portugal remained specialized in low and
medium-low technology sectors, with multiple challenges restricting the ability to explore
knowledge-intensive sectors. Indeed, although in 2020 it became Strong Innovator, the
employment in medium and high-tech manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services
only grew in two of the seven regions [74]. Indeed, a study of [76] shows that only large
companies in Portugal consider work carried out in collaboration with universities as
important. As the countries under study (Portugal and Spain) consist mostly of micro and
SMEs, the implementation of RIS3 measures can be questioned.
In Spain, several factors affecting productivity, such as underinvestment in public and
private R&D, and poor coordination at all levels of governance, and insufficient policy
evaluation hampers innovation. Stronger cooperation between academia and business
is needed. Only in this way can we contribute to knowledge diffusion, increasing the
number of innovative products and processes [73,75]. Indeed, both countries’ university
entrepreneurial capacities still need to be improved, translating into limited regional
innovative development. Thus, considering restrictions on European funding imposed
by the priority domains selected for each region, RIS3 can be seen to have had a negative
impact on the U-I relationship. Business innovation is heavily dependent on funding, and
companies cannot innovate Intramural. If they are not aligned with set priorities, they
will not be able to compete for community funds and will not seek collaboration with
universities. If there is no U-I collaboration, knowledge transfer is likewise compromised.
Thus, research proposal 2 (P2: The choice of priority investment areas for innovation
facilitated the transfer of technology and knowledge through funded projects) seems to be
contradicted by this study. In Portugal, the analysis carried out by Nacional and Regional
priority areas shows that the fairly broad set of Nacional priority areas corresponds in terms
of approved eligible investment to a strong concentration on three or four areas for the set
of typologies of operations analysed. At the national level, this degree of concentration
is lower, with a relatively limited number of priority areas appearing with less notoriety
in terms of approved eligible investment. In general, the types of operations in which the
national and regional guidelines are a simple criterion of merit allow some National priority
areas to show a presence that they cannot obtain in the types in which these guidelines are
an admissibility condition.
Smart specialization is based on the premise that identifying the right priorities for
a given territory must involve all regional stakeholders (business, government, univer-
sity, and civil society). The interaction between all these actors, the fourfold helix, must
be enterprising and targeted at transforming the economy via innovation. This requires
sophisticated governance capable of involving all these actors, which goes beyond tradi-
tional governance forms typically led by one actor (usually a governmental entity) [61,77].
Advances in productivity and competitiveness require prioritization, thus requiring inclu-
sive governance that enables the exploitation of knowledge and the alignment of agent
all local agents’ capabilities. According to the focus group, most Portuguese or Spanish
regions have no governance model in place, and there have been no changes to RIS3. These
arguments contradict proposition 3 (Process governance models are properly implemented,
facilitating necessary changes to RIS3).
One of the conclusions of the evaluation report in Portugal is the recognition that in
Regional RIS3 the virtuous relationship between the characteristics of regional innovation
systems (RIS) and the institutional agility of the governance model is a relevant factor
in minimizing the risks of uneven development that the RIS3 approach can bring to the
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maturation of regional innovation systems. In this context, it is recommended that, in the
guidelines of the Nacional Coordination Council (Nacional RIS3) and of the governance
model of the current framework (Portugal 2020) itself, conditions can be created for gov-
ernance at the regional level, more strongly articulated with the characteristics of the RIS
that frame them, with greater sensitivity to outcome indicators that can better reflect the
starting structural conditions in which RIS3 is implemented [78]. In Spain, the governance
of RIS3 also had some constraints. It was difficult to integrate participatory governance’s
novelty in elaborating strategies and their implementation, monitoring and evaluation,
with the traditional administration bound to a very strict administrative procedure [76].
In sum, both countries, with their regional and national structures, present difficulties in
governance of their smart specialization strategies.
Although the EDP supposedly requires the involvement of a wide range of stake-
holders, i.e., representatives from all areas of society (the fourfold helix), instead, in many
regions, it is represented by private, public or non-profit sector elites [79]. Additional obsta-
cles include companies’ low absorption capacity, limited worker qualifications [67], and/or
insufficient university commitment to these policies [80]. This process, which aims to foster
internationalizing innovation, thus becomes debilitated or even non-existent. Insufficient
U-I links can undermine the innovation system’s effectiveness, and consequently the still
very nascent EDP. This is perhaps one of the biggest obstacles to the process [73,81–87].
Thus, these results contradicted the fourth proposition (P4: The EDP allows discovering
new domains of opportunities).
Despite the assumption that regional innovation is improving, RIS3 did not have the
expected impact on Portugal and Spain’s performance. Portugal, despite having become a
Strong Innovator, has much that remains to be done in terms of smart specialization, as
can be seen from the low number of thematic priorities where there has been participation
by companies in quest of EU funds to leverage the innovation needed in an increasingly
competitive business world.
R&D intensity has decreased since the economic crisis, and despite some changes in
Portugal, smart specialization measures have not changed that trend. As pointed out by
both the focus group and documentation, if the EDP was the focal point of RIS3, it has
failed. This is due both to how the smart specialization strategy was implemented, i.e., the
lack of adequate governance models, and the countries under the study’s particularities.
These are two countries with a history of poor U-I linkage.
5.2. Discussion: RIS3 and Open Innovation Dynamics
European research policy underlines the effectiveness of the proximity approach
for local university research centres to innovation to local businesses and small firms to
improve knowledge and technology transfer [88–90].
This leads us to the topic of open innovation in RIS3 dynamics.
Open innovation is “the inputs and outputs of knowledge to accelerate internal
innovation and expand markets for the external use of innovation” [91]. In fact, open
innovation is an innovation model based on knowledge inputs and outputs to leverage
internal innovation processes, reaching new paths to the market as companies seek to
advance their technologies [92]. It is based on this choice of priorities reflected in the RIS3
plan, considering the most relevant areas in each region, allowing the identification of
elements that assist in the formulation of strategies, guiding and grounding in business
practices. This open innovation concept is a founding element of the types of collaborative
relationships monitored in RIS3 and is also very relevant to identifying innovative actors
and resources in public and private sectors [93].
According to our results and [76], the Portuguese and Spanish business fabric is mainly
made up of micro and SMEs, and community funds, allocated under RIS3, could boost
open innovation. Since small companies struggle with technological change as they cannot
invest and create the industrial conditions for R&D and deliver the value-added products
that the market needs [94–96], the Regional Innovation Strategies could be the mechanism
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to boost open innovation, and in this matter corporate innovation. Nevertheless, despite
the improvements in terms of innovation in Portugal, there is still, in both countries, a low
rate of knowledge and technology transfer from R&D centres to companies, as well as a
weak capacity of the industry to incorporate innovation form those centres.
It is important to bear in mind that only enterprises whose activity falls within the
predefined priority areas are financed. This intensifies the difficulties experienced by these
companies, without intramural innovation, in their search for partnerships that favour
their involvement in both national and international markets.
With the implementation of RIS3, the EU intended, however, to fill the existing market
failures in this continent, leveraging an entrepreneurial system that allows a business
dynamic of open innovation, thus creating networks between the various stakeholders and
enabling regional development.
6. Conclusions
6.1. Theoretical and Empirical Implications
These results allow us to conclude that, despite the need for investment priorities
that leverage innovation and, consequently, the European regions’ economy, the intelli-
gent specialization strategy has not achieved the expected results. As U-I collaboration
depends heavily on community funds, RIS3 can negatively affect already weak links with
its impositions and restrictions.
This study contributes in two ways to the literature. Firstly, data are presented on
the new rules for the allocation RIS3 community innovation support funds. Secondly, it is
shown that the RIS3 did not foster innovation in Portugal and Spain and that the smart
specialization strategies require review.
RIS3 aims to leverage the innovation of European countries so that they become inter-
nationally competitive. However, we cannot forget the heterogeneity of these countries.
Thus, smart specialization strategies should be rethought. Community innovation funding
should not be restricted to strongly economic and/or scientific regions, leaving out others
where the economic benefit might be greater. For example, priority areas based on endoge-
nous products are often denied funding, not allowing innovation to be funded based on
products from other regions or countries. This innovation bottleneck should be reviewed,
and all innovation ought to be funded. It should be borne in mind that smart specialization
strategies cannot be based on excessively technological innovation, especially in regions
with a business fabric consisting mostly of micro and SME. In fact, and according to the
Oslo Manual, the exclusion of small innovations contradicts the potential for significant
growth from incremental improvements [92].
In terms of open innovation, it is imperative to understand how RIS3 procedures
help support this model and if not, where the bottleneck is and which measures could be
applied by European Community or the countries.
6.2. Policy Recommendations
Portuguese and Spanish innovation still has a long way to improve their innovation
performance to become strong innovators in the case of Spain, or leaders in Portugal’s
case. RIS3 monitoring and governance measures are crucial to providing regions with
what they need: efficient use of EU funds that might support business innovation. Regions
should look at the results of EU funding and rethink the priorities. It is counterproductive
to continue to reject projects if they are proven to be innovative and the products capable
of internationalization, simply because they are not aligned with the chosen priority areas.
Support measures should be put in place for companies that do not fit into the priority
areas now chosen or to be chosen. Such measures could be national, non-EU incentives
with a lower funding rate.
This path also requires more effective and efficient U-I collaboration, which might
boost EDP implementation. Measures to encourage said collaboration are necessary. On
the one hand, we have an entrepreneurial fabric, mostly micro or SMEs, with insufficient
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financial or human resources to develop innovation, and much to innovate technologically.
On the other hand, we still have very inactive universities looking for industry partnerships,
promoting knowledge and technology transfers. Such measures could include a reduction
in the tax burden for companies and a premium for universities. U-I linkages should also be
reviewed, and (more) specialized structures for seeking partnerships and funding should
be set up.
6.3. Limitations and Future Research
This study has several limitations: firstly, subjectivity, which is always an issue in
qualitative studies, particularly in data analysis via the interview coding and categorization
process. Moreover, the focus group lacked any business representatives. Finally, the
similarities between the two countries studied should be considered. Future research
should compare Portugal and Spain with other countries, both moderately innovative
ones and leaders, to determine whether the issues raised here are similar and why. Finally,
it would also be useful to look into the impact of RIS3 on this community framework
following its completion.
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